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ABSTRACT
This review article and special issue introduction argues that studying the 
relationship between the populist radical right and the welfare state requires 
bridging literatures that have so far advanced with little mutual engagement: 
party politics and voting behaviour research on the one hand, and comparative 
political economy and welfare state research on the other. In this way, the 
article highlights the advantages of connecting different academic sub-fields 
in studying radical right politics. First, the literature of comparative political 
economy on the multi-dimensionality of welfare politics can contribute to a 
clearer understanding of both the welfare-related causes and consequences 
of radical right support. Second, the party politics literature on the radical 
right’s ideology provides theoretical tools to explain the welfare-related con-
sequences of populist radical right parties. The article illustrates the advantages 
of bridging these literatures through the empirical contributions in this special 
issue and concludes with avenues of future research.
The relationship between political parties and the welfare state has been 
the subject of vibrant debate in comparative politics and political economy 
across the post-war era. Studying the question of how and why ‘parties 
matter’ goes back to the classical partisan theory advanced by Hibbs 
(1977), Castles (1982), and Schmidt (1996) that the political left represents 
the material interests of lower income groups whereas the political right 
those of higher income groups. In this ‘industrial’ view, the origins of 
the welfare state depended in large part on types and degrees of labour 
power (Korpi 2006). However, a more recent wave of scholarship on the 
‘post-industrial’ era has called into question the traditional left-right 
distinction by highlighting fundamentally changing (and increasingly 
complex) patterns of voting behaviour, cleavage structures, party com-
petition contexts, and party-voter linkages (Beramendi et al. 2015; 
Häusermann et al. 2013).
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2 P. RATHGEB AND M. R. BUSEMEYER
An important reason why the relationship between political parties 
and the welfare state has become much more complicated is the rise of 
populist radical right parties (PRRPs), i.e. a party family that is charac-
terised by an ideology of nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 
2007).1 Looking at 23 European countries, the average vote share of this 
party family increased from 2 percent in 1990 to 17.5 percent in 2019 
(Parlgov database, cf. Döring and Manow 2020).2 PRRPs are thus widely 
considered the most successful new party family in the past roughly 
three decades. While these parties might have downplayed the 
socio-economic dimension in an effort of ‘position-blurring’ in the past 
(Rovny 2013), this appears no longer feasible, given their growing elec-
toral strength and political influence in a context of de-industrialisation 
and globalisation in tandem with the fallouts from the Great Recession 
(post-2008) and the Covid-19 pandemic (since 2020).
In this special issue, we therefore address two overarching questions: 
How do PRRPs shape the welfare state? And how does the welfare state 
itself shape the electoral fortunes of PRRPs? In doing so, we build on 
and contribute to the literatures of (1) party politics and voting behaviour 
on the one hand, and (2) comparative political economy and welfare 
state research on the other. Broadly speaking, the relationship between 
the radical right and the welfare state has not figured very prominently 
in both lines of research. The party politics and voting behaviour liter-
ature primarily focussed on the socio-cultural dimension (e.g. immigration 
control, law & order, crime) when explaining the emergence or positions 
of the radical right, while placing much less emphasis on the intersection 
between welfare state institutions and the populist radical right (Golder 
2016; Mudde 2019). By contrast, comparative political economy and 
welfare state research has traditionally been more concerned with the 
socio-economic dimension, but it focussed more on mainstream parties 
of the left and right (Beramendi et al. 2015; Häusermann et al. 2013). 
Our primary goal in this special issue is to bring these different per-
spectives together in order to advance our understanding of the rela-
tionship between the radical right and the welfare state. In doing so, we 
highlight recent innovations in both literatures and draw on the contri-
butions to this special issue.
Mutual neglect: classical perspectives in party politics and 
welfare state research
The classical perspectives in party politics and voting behaviour research 
on the one hand, and comparative political economy and welfare state 
research on the other, have mutually neglected each other in assessing 
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the association between PRRPs and the welfare state. Broadly speaking, 
the welfare state literature has long been concerned with the connection 
between party politics and social policy making, but in doing so, has 
mainly focussed on mainstream parties of the left and right in govern-
ment, while neglecting the emergent PRRPs as a potentially special case. 
In fact, it is probably fair to say that comparative welfare state research 
has been particularly keen on exploring the role of the left for welfare 
state development (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979; more recently, Kenworty 
2019), while only gradually paying more attention to the role of Christian 
democratic (Van Kersbergen 1995), mainstream conservative (Jensen 
2014) and, very recently, radical right (Afonso and Rennwald 2018) and 
green parties (Röth and Schwander 2021). Vice versa, the literature 
explaining the emergence of PRRPs has mainly looked at driving forces 
that are related to socio-cultural issues such as immigration, European 
integration and (opposition to) multiculturalism, whereas the welfare 
state played only a negligible role, even in accounts looking at the eco-
nomic grievances of radical right voters (Golder 2016). In the following, 
we will briefly review these classical perspectives before we start to 
develop a more integrated perspective by drawing on recent innovations 
in the literature as well as the contributions to this special issue.
Welfare-related consequences of PRRPs: party politics and its 
impact on the welfare state
The roots of scholarship on the impact of party politics on the welfare 
state go back to power resource theory from the 1970s and early 1980s 
(Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983, 2006; Stephens 1979), which had 
been framed against the then dominant modernisation theory approach 
that explained the development of the welfare state primarily as a 
reaction to socio-economic and demographic problem pressures. Looking 
back from today, early contributions in the power resource tradition 
had a rather simplistic understanding of the link between party politics 
and the welfare state. The power resources of the ‘left’ (social demo-
cratic parties in government and parliament in combination with pow-
erful trade unions in the labour market arena) largely determined the 
generosity of the welfare state, which was regarded as a policy instru-
ment ‘against markets’ (Esping-Andersen 1985). The policy positions 
of different political parties were derived from the economic interests 
of their respective electoral constituencies, with left-wing parties rep-
resenting the lower income classes and right-wing parties representing 
the upper income classes (Hibbs 1977). Thus, political parties acted as 
‘transmission belts’ of the economic (and distributive) interests of their 
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electorate into the parliamentary arena and eventually into governmental 
policy making.
Over the past decade, a wealth of scholarship has emerged that has 
developed a much more fine-grained understanding of the complex rela-
tionship between party politics and the welfare state. For instance, the 
influential Varieties of Capitalism debate of the early 2000s (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005) has forcefully argued that the relationship 
between the welfare state and markets is not necessarily a purely antag-
onistic one, as social policies can effectively contribute to and promote 
the formation of particular kinds of skills that in turn contribute to 
economic growth (see Iversen and Soskice 2019 for a recent update on 
this line of thought). The debate on the social investment welfare state 
model has also continued along these lines, emphasising that social 
investment policies focussing on the generation and maintenance of 
human capital as well as on the provision of sufficient ‘buffers’ can 
promote economic development, while also mitigating social inequalities 
(Esping-Andersen 2002; Hemerijck 2013, 2018; Morel et al. 2012; Plavgo 
and Hemerijck 2020). As social investment policies simultaneously address 
these different goals and as they are broadly popular, the ‘party politics’ 
of social investment cannot be easily matched to the traditional left-right 
scheme, but instead unfolds against the background of a more complex 
and multidimensional policy space (Garritzmann et al. 2018; Häusermann 
et al. 2015).
In line with this notion of the increasing complexity of the partisan 
politics of welfare state, research on individual attitudes and preferences 
towards the welfare state has also expanded its analytical focus on the 
driving forces of attitudes (see Svallfors 2012 for an overview of this 
research). As mentioned above, the pioneering work on the partisan 
politics of the welfare state has emphasised the centrality of economic, 
i.e. material interests of individuals as driving forces of party positions. 
Even though material self-interest (i.e. the economic position of individ-
uals) has repeatedly been found to be a powerful predictor of attitudes 
(e.g. Finseraas 2009; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009 and many 
others), scholarship has discovered a range of additional factors that 
matter (and whose importance may even have increased over time, 
although there is little research on that specific aspect). For instance, 
norms and values also strongly influence the formation of attitudes and 
therefore also the vote choice of individual citizens (see e.g. research on 
the role of attitudes towards the determinants of economic success (‘luck 
vs. effort’) (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005), altruism and social solidarity 
(Goerres and Tepe 2010; Lupu and Pontusson 2011). A further strand 
of research of relevance here is scholarship on policy feedback, i.e. how 
existing policies and institutions shape attitudinal patterns (see Béland 
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and Schlager 2019; Busemeyer et al. 2021; Jacobs and Weaver 2015 for 
recent overviews). This kind of research therefore paints a more complex 
picture of how attitudes are formed and therefore how political parties 
derive their policy positions, if and when these are somehow related to 
the demands of their electoral constituencies.
In spite of these recent advances, as forcefully argued in a review 
article by Häusermann et al. (2013), much of comparative welfare state 
research retains a strong influence from the early work in power resource 
theory (see Busemeyer 2009 for a similar argument), neglecting some of 
the insights that research in the field of party politics has produced. For 
instance, the electoral constituencies of particular parties are regarded 
as rather fixed and static, whereas in fact there has been a lot of dynamic 
movement across the years, in particular for mainstream parties of the 
left (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Kitschelt 1999). The shift in the 
electoral support coalition of mainstream left parties (social democratic 
and socialist parties) from the traditional working class to the ‘educated’ 
middle classes has opened up space for PRRPs to appeal to (parts of) 
the (male) blue-collar working class (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Oesch 
and Rennwald 2018), as we further discuss below. Social democratic 
parties in government have adjusted their policy stances to appeal stra-
tegically to new potential constituencies in the middle classes, in partic-
ular among the so-called ‘socio-cultural professionals’ working in the 
public sector (i.e. the welfare state), by emphasising education and other 
social investment policies (Busemeyer 2009; Häusermann et al. 2013). 
Vice versa, mainstream right parties have also moved towards the centre 
to appeal to the ‘urban middle class’ (e.g. managers) by, for instance, 
promoting policies that improve the reconciliation of work and family 
life, even – and maybe even particularly – in conservative welfare states 
such as Germany (Morgan 2013).
In short, these examples show that comparative welfare state research 
increasingly pays attention to the role of electoral competition, moving 
beyond the simplistic depiction of political parties as transmission belts 
of the economic interests of their particular constituencies and instead 
developing a more complex understanding of political parties as strategic 
actors that also try to shape and influence both party competition as 
well as public opinion. Still (with few exceptions to be discussed below), 
it is fair to say that these debates largely focus on how mainstream 
parties of the left and right adapt to changing socio-economic and polit-
ical circumstances.
Populist radical right parties have been much less at the centre of 
attention in comparative political economy and welfare state research. 
Partly, this might well be simply a reflection of data limitations. Regarding 
the measurement of welfare attitudes and preferences, the supporters of 
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PRRPs were relatively small minorities in a number of countries until 
recent years (while comparative data was much less available during their 
electoral breakthroughs in the 1990s), so that the number of observations 
of these individuals in comparative surveys of public opinion has been 
too small for quantitative analyses. Moreover, PRRP supporters used to 
be less inclined to reveal themselves in public opinion surveys compared 
to supporters of traditional parties. When it comes to actual policy 
making, the country cases and time periods in which PRRPs were in 
power have been very limited too (again until more recently). These 
practical considerations might help understand why comparative political 
economy and welfare state research has only recently started to study 
the association between PRRPs and social policy making (see below for 
more details).
Welfare-related causes of PRRPs: explaining the rise of the radical 
right
While the welfare-related consequences of PRRPs have so far played a 
relatively minor role in comparative political economy and welfare state 
research, party politics and voting behaviour research has also focussed 
less on the welfare-related causes of radical right support (cf. Arzheimer 
2009; Golder 2016; for notable exceptions, see e.g. Halikiopoulou and 
Vlandas 2016; Swank and Betz 2003; Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019). 
Broadly speaking, the recent debate on the demand-side factors behind 
the rise of PRRPs has mainly played out between the ‘cultural backlash’ 
versus ‘economic anxiety’ arguments (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018). 
Whereas the former argues that voters support PRRPs in order to retain 
their national identity in the face of growing immigration rates (e.g. 
Norris and Inglehart 2019), the latter claims that they are concerned 
with deteriorating economic prospects caused by the neoliberal consensus 
in the political mainstream (e.g. Hopkin 2020).
Central to both lines of argumentation is the notion introduced by 
Kriesi et al. (2008) that globalisation has created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
in economic as well as cultural ways. The ‘winners’ of globalisation are 
typically characterised by high levels of education, which often translates 
into liberal attitudes on cultural diversity as well as economic opportu-
nities across nation state borders. By contrast, the ‘losers’ of globalisation 
feel threatened by growing immigration rates, intensified economic com-
petition, and the declining relevance of the nation state alongside EU 
integration. It is the latter group of voters that typically constitutes the 
electoral reservoir of PRRPs (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015), but there 
has been a long and vibrant debate about whether the economic or 
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cultural forces of globalisation are more powerful in explaining the vote 
choice of the ‘losers’ of the globalisation.
Overall, the ‘cultural backlash’ hypothesis that the ‘losers’ of globali-
sation support PRRPs for identity-related reasons has received more 
empirical attention (and thus support) than the ‘economic anxiety’ 
hypothesis. The socio-cultural dimension has therefore been the main 
avenue of research on the vote choice for the radical right. In the words 
of Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018: 7), the ‘culture’ versus ‘economy’ question 
‘has been debated, and we would argue that it was decided, decades ago 
(in favor of cultural backlash)’.
Notably, however, recent findings on the role of social status in voting 
behaviour research suggest that ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’ explanations are 
much more complementary than usually portrayed in academic debates. 
Gidron and Hall (2017) show how economic and cultural developments 
interact in shaping a ‘status anxiety’ that increases the likelihood of voting 
for the radical right, especially among a core group of working-class men 
(see also Gidron and Hall 2020). Carreras et al. (2019) find a similar 
dynamic in that long-term economic factors caused precisely those 
short-term anti-immigration attitudes that explain the ‘Leave’ vote in the 
Brexit referendum. Drawing on individual-level panel data, Kurer (2020) 
comes to a similar conclusion in that the relative decline in the social 
hierarchy makes (male) routine workers susceptible to the nativist plat-
forms of PRRPs. This position is in line with Engler and Weisstanner 
(2021) who find that growing income inequality creates a fear of social 
decline among previously dominant political groups – individuals with 
high subjective social status and lower-middle incomes –, which have 
turned into an important electorate of PRRPs. What these studies suggest 
is that the threat of decline in social status, rather than actual outcomes 
of decline (e.g. unemployment, poverty), drives voters into the hands of 
PRRPs, as the latter offer voters the prospect of defending traditional 
social boundaries, especially between the native in-group and the immi-
grant out-group. These findings help understand why welfare chauvinism 
– i.e. selective cuts in social protection targeted at immigrants – is 
important to PRRPs, even though radical right voters do not gain material 
benefits from reduced welfare entitlements for others. But cuts for 
non-citizens may help to restore the relative social status of previously 
dominant political groups, typically the male, core workforce in 
manufacturing.
Despite this extensive decades-long debate in voting behaviour research, 
the role of social policy in mediating electoral support for PRRPs has 
received very little attention. Although the emerging literature on the 
role of social status is useful in understanding the ‘culturalisation’ of 
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socio-economic concerns among PRRP voters, we have a limited under-
standing of how the welfare state can mediate the perceived threat of 
social decline in ways that reduce the electoral success of PRRPs. To the 
best of our knowledge, the exceptions in this regard are Swank and Betz 
(2003) who show that the effect of globalisation on support for the 
radical right is contingent on welfare state generosity (see also Swank 
and Betz 2018), whereas Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016) and Vlandas 
and Halikiopoulou (2019) emphasise the institutional design of unem-
ployment benefits and employment protection in mediating the impact 
of unemployment on far-right voting. Overall, this lack of attention is 
surprising given that such a research agenda would arguably have political 
relevance and real-world implications for policy making in light of the 
radical right’s enduring attacks on human rights and liberal democracy. 
In fact, the welfare state and the labour market represent crucial policy 
tools available to policy-makers in addressing the status anxieties the 
above literature has identified as one of the root causes of radical 
right voting.
An emerging literature: recent contributions on the welfare-related 
consequences of PRRPs
The previous sections have demonstrated that the relationship between 
the radical right and the welfare state has not figured very prominently 
in comparative political economy and welfare state research on the one 
hand, and voting behaviour and party politics on the other. As we aim 
to bring these different lines of research together, we can build on a 
small, but growing number of contributions that have started to embrace 
this goal. The main issue in this emerging literature is the analysis of 
the radical right’s socio-economic policy positions more broadly con-
ceived. In short, the socio-economic positions of PRRPs have been con-
sidered either ‘blurred’ (Rovny 2013; Rovny and Polk 2020), centrist (De 
Lange 2007; Mudde 2007) or, more recently, leftist (Afonso and Rennwald 
2018; Eger and Valdez 2015; Harteveld 2016; Michel and Lefkofridi 2017). 
While these studies are in many ways useful first steps, their inconclusive 
results suggest that the traditional left-right distinction is not necessarily 
an adequate conceptual apparatus to analyse the socio-economic agenda 
of the radical right. As PRRPs display both right-wing and left-wing 
elements in their economic platforms, they often defy the conventional 
left-right cleavage in favour of producerist distinctions between 
hard-working ‘makers’ against self-serving ‘takers’ (Rathgeb 2021; see also 
Abts et al. 2021) or sovereignist economic appeals to ‘take back control’ 
against foreign interventions of all sorts (Mazzoleni and Ivaldi 2020).
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In the area of welfare state reforms, Afonso (2015) and Röth et al. 
(2018) have been pioneering in analysing the influence of the radical 
right on social policy making. They find that PRRPs indeed defend the 
generosity of welfare benefits vis-à-vis the centre-right when in govern-
ment, but are opposed to high levels of economic regulation at the same 
time. In a similar vein, Pingerra (2020) and Chueri (2020) show that 
PRRPs are particularly supportive of generous public pensions. Taken 
together, these results suggest that PRRPs can be both ‘pro-welfare’ (i.e. 
left-wing) as well as ‘anti-regulation’ (i.e. right-wing), which buttresses 
the view that the radical right’s socio-economic policies do not necessarily 
map onto the traditional left-right distinction in consistent ways. The 
contributions in this special issue will continue along the lines of these 
pioneering contributions by pursuing a fine-grained conceptualisation of 
the multi-dimensional character of welfare state politics and policy 
choices, as we will outline in detail below.
Bridging literatures in the study of the radical right and the 
welfare state: overview of the special issue contributions
We believe that the mutual neglect between party politics and voting 
behaviour research on the one hand, and comparative political economy 
and welfare state research on the other, has been unfortunate because 
both lines of research can benefit from each other’s insights in the study 
of the populist radical right and the welfare state. In the following, we 
highlight a few concrete issues, where this exchange would be particularly 
fruitful from our perspective.
First, empirical studies on party competition, vote choice, and partisan 
policy influence would benefit from a more complex and differentiated 
understanding of the welfare state. The conventional foci on ‘welfare 
generosity’ and ‘economic redistribution’ are too crude to capture how 
different dimensions of the welfare state affect voting behaviour at the 
micro level as well as the dynamics of party competition and policy 
making at the macro level. We thereby draw on comparative political 
economy and welfare state research to illuminate the relationship between 
the radical right and the welfare state in multi-dimensional terms 
(Beramendi et al. 2015; Bonoli 2010; Garritzmann et al. 2017; Häusermann 
2012; Hemerijck 2018). More specifically, and building on this literature, 
the contributions by Busemeyer et al. (2021) and Enggist and Pingerra 
(2021) in this special issue distinguish between social transfers and other 
forms of compensatory social spending (i.e. old-age pensions), social 
investments and human capital formation (i.e. childcare, education) as 
well as ‘workfare’ (i.e. tight obligations in return for the receipt of social 
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transfers). In this way, these articles nuance and qualify existing studies 
that consider PRRPs as ‘blurry’ on the socio-economic dimension (Rovny 
and Polk 2020) or ‘pro-welfare’ in social policy (Afonso and 
Rennwald 2018).
In this regard, the findings by Enggist and Pingerra (2021) on policy 
positions of PRRPs (the supply-side of electoral competition) have import-
ant implications that should be explored in further research. By distin-
guishing between social consumption and investment, they show that 
PRRPs are much more outspoken on the goals and principles that the 
welfare state should meet than the ‘position-blurring’ hypothesis suggests 
(Rovny 2013). These parties clearly emphasise traditional forms of social 
consumption (i.e. old-age pensions) while opposing social investments 
that are aimed at lifelong learning, education and gender equality, argu-
ably in line with the policy preferences of lower-educated (male) labour 
market insiders. Hence, their contribution provides a fine-grained under-
standing of the radical right’s social policy stances by going beyond the 
conventional focus on ‘welfare generosity’. In short, PRRPs would rather 
have a transfer-oriented welfare state that downgrades those social invest-
ments on which new social risk groups rely to foster their labour market 
participation and reconciliation of work-family life. As a result, they are 
the main opponent to the recalibration of welfare states to the social 
demands of post-industrial labour markets.
These results at the supply-side are in line with the findings presented 
by Busemeyer et al. (2021) at the demand-side of voter preferences. 
Drawing on an original survey of public opinion on education and related 
social policies, they show that PRRP voters are not generally ‘pro-welfare’; 
they instead support what the authors call a particularistic-authoritarian 
welfare state, displaying moderate support only for ‘deserving’ benefit 
recipients (i.e. the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare 
approach and litt le support for social investment. The 
particularistic-authoritarian conception of the welfare state is particular 
to PRRP supporters and therefore different from the welfare state models 
supported by other partisan constituencies. Different from the supporters 
of centre-right parties, PRRP voters are more likely to support social 
transfers for ‘deserving’ social groups (e.g. the elderly). Different from 
the supporters of centre-left parties, they are much more likely to be 
opposed to social investment policies as well as to social transfers for 
‘non-deserving’ social groups (e.g. the unemployed), but they are in 
favour of workfare policies. The article also shows how the policy 
demands of voters resonate with the authoritarian values that characterise 
the ideology of PRRPs. The function of the welfare state, in this view, 
is not only to protect against market and life-course risks, but also to 
ensure conformity with socio-cultural norms inherited from the past.
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The benefits of adopting a multi-dimensional perspective on the wel-
fare state are also illustrated when studying the welfare-related causes of 
the PRRP vote. Based on European Social Survey (ESS) and social policy 
datasets, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou (2021) show how different dimen-
sions of the welfare state influence the vulnerability of voters to social 
risks, which in turn influences their likelihood to vote for the radical 
right. Their findings suggest that the rise of PRRPs is not merely a 
‘natural’ result of secular trends like globalisation and de-industrialisation, 
but rather a lack of responsiveness on the part of the welfare state to 
social risks. More specifically, the effect of social risk exposure on radical 
right voting is contingent on the generosity of social policies targeting 
these particular social risks.
Adding to the previous articles, the contribution by Burgoon and 
Schakel (2021) shows that the presence of generous welfare arrangements 
may overall dampen an anti-globalisation backlash. Seen in this way, the 
welfare state not only puts constraints on the electoral fortunes of the 
radical right in mitigating economic uncertainties (Vlandas and 
Halikiopoulou, 2021); it may also moderate the anti-globalisation rhetoric 
in manifestoes that is part of the broader radical right’s agenda. However, 
radical right parties share with radical left parties an opposition to 
European integration and immigration when they operate in generous 
welfare state contexts. They conclude from this finding that the radical 
right (and especially the radical left) mobilises on an anti-globalisation 
platform only when internationalism seems to put constraints on nation-
ally anchored welfare rights.
Second, even when conceptualising party politics as a (re-)distributive 
struggle that is eventually rooted in material self-interest as is commonly 
done in a comparative political economy, empirical studies also need to 
take into account the socio-culturally laden ideology of PRRPs to under-
stand their socio-economic consequences in policy making. In other words, 
when studying PRRPs, ideology may well matter more than in the case 
of traditional mainstream parties of the left and right. While the material 
self-interest of voters certainly remains important to understanding par-
tisan policy demands, PRRPs derive their socio-economic policy demands, 
at least in part, from their nativist and authoritarian worldview. Thus, 
scholarship in party politics and voting behaviour can significantly help 
in understanding how the ideological values of PRRPs influences their 
social policy positions and choices in government (Akkerman 2015; 
Minkenberg 2002; Mudde 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Rydgren 
2005). As PRRPs emerged by mobilising on the nativist-authoritarian pole 
of the socio-cultural cleavage, their socio-economic policies cannot be 
derived from the left-right dimension exclusively. This recognition should 
thus inform the theorisation of the radical right’s social policies.
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The articles in this special issue show how ideological values inform 
the social policies of PRRPs. Ennser-Jedenastik (2021), for example, 
demonstrates how a pro-natalist ideology (based on its nativism) with a 
traditional perspective on gender roles (based on its authoritarianism) 
can help understand the radical right’s impact on family policy. Similar 
to the contributions described above, he distinguishes between social 
consumption efforts geared to uphold male breadwinner legacies (child 
benefits) versus social investments intended to facilitate greater gender 
equality (childcare). Whereas partisan effects on expenditure levels are 
limited (like in analyses of ‘welfare generosity’), PRRPs in government 
are associated with larger differences between expenditures on family 
allowances and childcare expenditures, which contributes to restoring the 
‘traditional’ division of care work between men (full-time work) and 
women (part-time work and child rearing).
In a similar vein, Meardi and Guardiancich (2021) show in their case 
study comparison of Italy and Poland how the radical right expands 
monetary family support to reinvigorate the relevance of the (traditional) 
family in welfare provision, which is in line with both countries’ strong 
Catholic legacies. Despite fiscal constraints, the Italian Lega and the 
Polish PiS used their government responsibility to expand monetary 
family support as well as pension entitlements for the ‘hard-working’ 
(male) core workforces, i.e. labour market insiders with a long history 
of pension contributions. By contrast, the social protection of labour 
market outsiders and especially social investments in the interest of new 
social risk groups featured much less prominently in their agendas (con-
sistent with Enggist and Pingerra 2021 and Busemeyer et al. 2021 
described above). Although both parties operated in very different country 
contexts, they displayed similar policy priorities when in office, which 
underscores the influence of similar cultural values, but also the material 
interests of disadvantaged regions becoming receptive to the radical right 
(Southern voters for Lega, rural previously non-voters in Poland).
The mobilising capacity of the radical right’s ideology is also on display 
when looking at how centre-right parties respond to it. Drawing on a 
qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis, Donoghue and 
Kuisma (2021) highlight how the electoral challenge from the radical 
right UKIP empowered the more radical factions within the Conservative 
Party to embrace welfare chauvinist discourses in the wake of the Brexit 
referendum. In line with the ‘Leave campaign’, the Conservatives invoked 
social citizenship to delegitimise EU institutions in an effort to redraw 
the boundaries of welfare deservingness along ethno-national lines. Seen 
in this way, the Brexit outcome is a textbook example of the mainstream-
ing of the radical right’s ideology of nativism – and thus welfare chau-
vinism – in the domain of social policy.
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The insights of this special issue might animate research at the inter-
section of party politics, voting behaviour and comparative welfare state 
scholarship to study the future reform trajectories of the welfare state, 
in particular in light of the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic. Even 
though, of course, PRRPs have been on the ascent before, the refugee 
crisis of the mid-2010s has significantly boosted electoral support for 
them across many countries. Potentially, the salience of migration as a 
contentious political issue is and will be superseded by concerns about 
health care and the sustainability of the welfare state more generally. 
Thus, after having been pushed to the margins of party competition for 
some time, the welfare state may yet recapture its traditional place at 
the top of the political agenda (even if PRRPs are likely to reframe the 
repercussions of the crisis in a ‘natives first’ fashion). This has important 
implications for the electoral fate of PRRPs, which, however, need to be 
further explored. Combining the theoretical and methodological toolkit 
of the two traditions of scholarship discussed above would significantly 
help in this endeavour.
Conclusions and avenues of future research
Our key argument in this brief review is that future research needs to 
build more explicitly on both party politics and voting behaviour schol-
arship on the one hand, and comparative political economy and welfare 
state research on the other, when studying the nexus between partisanship 
and the welfare state. The contributions to this special issue thus provide 
illustrative examples of how to overcome the boundaries between these 
two strands of literature in the case of populist radical right parties.
What are the main takeaway points of this special issue? When it comes 
to the welfare-related consequences of the populist radical right, a crucial 
insight is that their voters do not support a leftist ‘pro-welfare’ response 
(Busemeyer et al. 2021), which is also mirrored in PRRPs’ policy positions 
in party manifestos and policy choices when in government (Enggist and 
Pingerra, 2021; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2021; Meardi and Guardiancich, 2021). 
The strong role of ‘deservingness’ conceptions implies a more 
particularistic-authoritarian approach to social policy (Busemeyer et al. 
2021), which caters to ‘hard-working’ people with long contribution 
records in social insurance (e.g. the elderly and labour market insiders), 
at the expense of new social risk groups (e.g. women, low-skilled and 
the young) and people with precarious attachments to the labour market 
(e.g. the unemployed and social assistance claimants). The contributions 
in our special issue add a new perspective to scholarship on this issue 
by adopting a multi-dimensional perspective on the welfare state, which 
14 P. RATHGEB AND M. R. BUSEMEYER
reveals that the recent literature that ascribes ‘pro-welfare’ positions to 
the radical right is misleading and too simplified. PRRPs and their sup-
porters are critically opposed to social investment policies, even though 
these policies are broadly supported among the population in general. 
At the same time, in line with the authoritarian aspect of the radical 
right’s ideology, they support workfare policies, i.e. a punitive disposition 
to those out of work. Within the domain of social transfers, the pro-welfare 
orientation of the radical right is essentially restricted to pro-elderly 
spending (i.e. pensions, health care) (Busemeyer et al. 2021; Enggist and 
Pingerra, 2021) and/or monetary family support along the lines of the 
male breadwinner model inherited from the industrial past 
(Ennser-Jedenastik, 2021; Meardi and Guardiancich, 2021).
When it comes to the welfare-related causes of the radical right, our 
second key takeaway point is on how the welfare state shapes the elec-
toral fortunes of the radical right and its position on globalisation. As 
the welfare state mitigates social risks, it also moderates the impact of 
economic insecurity on support for the radical right (Vlandas and 
Halikiopoulou, 2021). In addition, generous welfare states also dampen 
the anti-globalisation backlash among radical right parties (Burgoon and 
Schakel, 2021). Both of these effects have important implications for 
party competition. Our third takeaway point is therefore that the impact 
of the radical right on the welfare state may also work out indirectly 
through co-optation strategies by centre-right parties. The Brexit refer-
endum is an insightful case of how the radical right’s agenda can 
strengthen welfare chauvinist positions and discourses among centre-right 
parties (Donoghue and Kuisma, 2021).
This special issue generates avenues of future research on the study of 
the radical right and the welfare state. Coming back to the two overarching 
research questions we identified in the introduction to this article, we 
want to highlight the following issues that are, in our view, worth exploring 
further. Regarding the consequences of PRRPs ascent for the welfare state, 
a crucial question remains whether there is a particular type of welfare 
state that is promoted and supported by PRRPs or whether their social 
policy positions and preferences are simply (more or less) extreme versions 
of those of mainstream left- and right-wing parties. The articles in this 
special issue have started to explore this question and provided evidence 
to help in the belief that PRRPs indeed support a particular kind of 
welfare state that is qualitatively different from those of other parties, as 
this model is deeply rooted in the ideology of these parties. Thus, future 
research should explore whether indeed a common conception of the 
welfare state exists within the party family of PRRPs and to what extent 
the particular social policy preferences of PRRPs have actually affected 
and mediated the social policy positions of mainstream parties.
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A second issue for future research relates to the impact of welfare state 
institutions and policies on electoral support for PRRPs. Again, this special 
issue has started to explore this issue further, but there are still a number 
of open questions. For instance, on the one hand, a generous welfare 
state can mitigate labour market and other social risks, thereby reducing 
the economic grievances that might fuel support for PRRPs. On the other 
hand, a more generous welfare state also implies a higher degree of 
accessibility to welfare state services and benefits, which could in turn 
raise the sensitivity of voters to the issue of welfare state sustainability 
and vulnerability in the face of increasing demands from the citizenry 
(and potentially migrants). In a post-pandemic world of heightened fiscal 
austerity, public support for a more access-restricted (nativist) conception 
of the welfare state might therefore increase, in particular in those welfare 
states that are (or have been) particularly generous and universalistic in 
this regard. A further, but related issue – discussed for instance by Kurer 
(2020) with respect to semi-skilled routine workers – is to what extent 
welfare state policies can actually address the real or perceived grievances 
that drive (lower) middle class citizens to turn to PRRPs. If this is more 
about perceived status decline (i.e. identity politics) rather than real 
economic hardship (as suggested by Kurer (2020) as well as Burgoon 
et al. (2019)), the dampening effect of social policy expansion may be 
limited. This is however partly at odds with the findings of Vlandas and 
Halikiopoulou (2021) who do find a dampening effect of social policies. 
Hence, this issue needs further exploration in research.
Third, beyond research on the welfare-related causes and consequences, 
the findings of this special issue may also stimulate new avenues of study 
in party competition. An important assumption in the literature is that 
the electoral success of PRRPs rests on a high issue salience of immi-
gration relative to welfare (Afonso and Rennwald 2018). Yet, as PRRPs 
have become less ambiguous on their social policy priorities over time, 
it might be questionable whether this is still the case. For example, 
centre-left parties still have to balance between the social protection 
demands of blue-collar workers and the social investment demands of 
the new middle class (Häusermann 2018), whereas the voter demands 
and social policy platforms of PRRPs seem to have become more con-
sistent over time. Future research could therefore investigate whether the 
traditional socio-economic split inside the electoral support base of PRRPs 
– between the market-liberal petty bourgeoisie and the more 
protectionist-minded working-class (see e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005) – has 
become less acute over time. This could explain why PRRPs continue to 
enjoy relatively high levels of support even in times when economic and 
distributive issues are becoming more prominent again on the political 
agenda (Hernández and Kriesi 2016). In a similar vein, it could be 
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explored whether the ‘proletarisation’ of PRRPs is still exclusively based 
on an opposition to immigration or whether the particularistic-authoritarian 
welfare state model of PRRPs additionally attracts their vote choice.
Finally, the distinct social policy profile of PRRPs calls for further 
research on the coalitional politics of welfare policy making, given the 
radical right’s growing participation in governments. On the one hand, 
PRRPs might support the political left in expanding the generosity of 
public pensions and other areas of social protection for ‘hard-working’ 
(and thus deserving) social groups (e.g. elderly care). However, as public 
pensions are hard to retrench for electoral reasons in the wake of demo-
graphic ageing for any party, it could be argued that the radical right 
stands in conflict with the left not only on immigration, but also more 
generally on social policy. On the other hand, PRRPs might side with 
conservative parties in defending ‘male breadwinner’ legacies in family 
policy and tightening the conditions of benefit receipt for the unemployed 
(‘workfare’) while opposing social investment initiatives. They may also 
find common ground in attacks on the institutional power resources of 
trade unions, which would facilitate the economic right-wing agenda of 
the centre-right (and affiliated employer associations) and undermine the 
extra-parliamentary support base of the radical right’s main competitor 
for the blue-collar working-class vote, i.e. the centre-left (Rathgeb and 
Klitgaard, 2021). Seen in this way, the radical right’s dilemma of betraying 
either voters (by accepting welfare cuts) or their centre-right coalition 
partner (by opposing welfare cuts) – as identified by Afonso (2015) – 
might thus be more exclusively restricted to the area of public pensions. 
Once centre-right parties come to support (or at least accept) generous 
public pensions, PRRPs might well be a more reliable coalition partner 
for right-wing governments than in the past. This is especially the case 
as PRRPs become more mainstreamed in party competition as well as 
more experienced in governing. It therefore seems likely that the populist 
radical right is there to stay even as economic and distributive issues 
rise on the political agenda again.
Notes
 1. In this special issue, we follow Mudde’s (2007) definition of populist rad-
ical right parties, according to which these parties combine nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism in their ideology. However, other termi-
nology used throughout this special issue refers to the same group of 
parties (e.g. ‘far-right’ by Vlandas and Halikiopoulou, 2021).
 2. Classification of parties as ‘populist radical right’ is based on Mudde (2015: 
298–301); own updates for the period from 2015 to 2019. We included 
the following parties: the Austrian FPÖ/BZÖ, the Flemish FN/VB, the 
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German AfD, the Finnish PS, the Greek EL/LAOS, the Bulgarian Attack, 
the Croation HSP, the Danish DFP, the French FN/RN, the Hungarian 
Fidesz & Jobbik, the Dutch PVV, the Italian LN/Lega, the Polish LPR & 
PiS, the Norwegian FrP, the Romanian PRM, the Russian LDPR, the Serbian 
SNS/SRS, the Slovakian SNS, the Swedish SD, the Swiss SVP, the Spanish 
Vox, and the UK’s UKIP.
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